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Abstract
Security services are provided through: The applications, operating systems, databases,
and the network. There are many proposals to use policies to define, implement and evaluate
security services. We discussed a full test automation framework to test XACML based
policies. Using policies as input the developed tool can generate test cases based on the
policy and the general XACML model.
We evaluated a large dataset of policy implementations. The collection includes more than
200 test cases that represent instances of policies. Policies are executed and verified, using
requests and responses generated for each instance of policies. WSO2 platform is used to
perform different testing activities on evaluated policies.
Keywords: Software Defined Networks or Networking (SDN), Policy management, Change
impact

1. Introduction
Policies related to security and some business processes are implemented across all
enterprise applications. They are created, continuously monitored and applied. On the other
hand, there is a need to have policies that are agile and flexible. In addition to the need to
have them easy to change and update, there is a need to be able to detect who can be impacted
by the policy change and who will not.
We used WSO2 enterprise architecture (WSO2.com). Particularly, the WSO2 security
component that can define and interact with security is called identity server Figure 1. The
application is built to fit the cloud architecture and to enable adding and configuring
components very flexibly.

Figure 1. WSO2 Identity Server Example
In this context, XACML (the Extensible Access Control Markup Language) from OASIS
(http://www.oasis-open.org) can be used for policy management and change analysis. This is
an authorization markup language based on the popular widely used XML, the defacto
Internet data and messaging communication language. It is also considered a security policy
creation and management application. XACML includes components to define a security
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policy to access computer resources (e.g., a data base, an application, and a web service), etc.,
It also includes rules to specify users and their permissions or privileges. Figure 2 shows
XACML authorization elements including: Policy component, policy set, policy, policy
administration point, rule, target, action, resource, subject and environment. We will describe
those components later on with a context example related to the paper subject.

Figure 2. XACML Policy Authorization Elements (Conceptual Diagram) [1]

2. Related Work
In this section, a description of some paper utilizes XACML policies in the area of testing
will be introduced. Software change impact analysis is a research field with many research
publications.
Fisler, et al., 2005 [2, 3] paper is a popular paper in terms of citations related to policy
impact analysis. The paper discussed policy architecture based on XACML. The paper
discussed Margrave software tool for role-based access control policies management. The
tool includes verification methods for policies against properties. Different rules in a policy
are modeled in multi-terminal_binary_decision_diagram (MTBDD) where output can be
permit or deny. Authors listed some deficiencies in the approach related to data values
reasoning and incomplete processing of XACML policies. The tool itself conducts change
impact analysis through comparing new and old tool statically without connecting those
policies with the actual system and measuring impact analysis on the actual system.
Martin and Xie paper 2007 discussed automatic testing for XACML policies [4]. A
framework and a tool called Cirg (for change impact request generation) are developed for
this purpose. The proposed system evaluates changes between different policies and making a
comparison of requests between them. Policies contain rules and rules contain target elements
that should be satisfied to fulfill a rule. Change impact between different versions of policies
is conducted using counter examples or mutants to evaluate differences between those
policies or versions of policies. Several metrics related to testing and coverage was also used
to evaluate effectiveness of test case generation methods.
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Biskup and J. Lopez 2007 paper discussed change impact analysis for firewall policies [5].
As firewall policies may need to change very often, testing them and their impact is necessary
and should be conducted smoothly and transparently. The input to the proposed system is a
policy and required changes. The output is then the impact of such proposed changes. Impact
is classified based on the nature of policy change (e.g., policy deletion, insertion, or update).

3. Goals and Approaches
The policy testing framework allows policies to be tested before enforcing them in live
systems. To allow this, the configuration or impact analysis component should be able to
evaluate system objects and those that are impacted by a particular policy.
Using some libraries, we developed a test automation framework to: read XACML files
and serialize them into their attributes, rules, targets, etc. The system then generates test cases
based on that information. Test execution and verification is then conducted to judge test
cases’ results based on predefined outputs. Test cases can be also used for regression testing
when policies are changed to evaluate test cases that are affected by policy change.
The developed system can be used offline where its input is XACML policies. It can be
also used part of a system to evaluate its current or applied policies.
Figure three below shows a context diagram for XACML showing its major architectural
components. The figure shows that XCAML develop, regulate, implement and test rules
through four components: PAP, PDP, PEP, PIP.
1. Policy Administration Point (PAP). This includes the management component that
also includes policies’ repository. Different rules can be written in one or more policies that
are stored and managed by PAP.
2. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). This is the interface of the whole XACML to the
system or the users. It received access requests and evaluates them with the help of other
components (especially PDP). Decision to permit or deny access to the resource is then taken
communicated to the user by PEP.
3. Policy Decision Point. This is the decision engine for access request. Data is collected
by PDP from other components. The component includes an analysis system or component to
make inference decisions.

Figure 3. XACML Context and Data Flow Diagram
4. Policy Information Point (PIP). This represents the memory or the kitchen where all
necessary information from other components, resources, or environment are collected.
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For testing XACML authorization systems, test cases can simulate PEP role in actual
systems. Test cases are represented by requests sent to policies where judgment is made based
on policy and the request as a test case instance.
Figure 4 below summarizes tasks for XACML test automation framework major activities.

Figure 4. XACML based Test Framework
The test automation framework starts from (Read XACML Policy). In test automation
framework, model based approaches are used formally describe framework inputs (in this
case XACML policies). The output is a formal model that parses XACML different
components. From this model test cases or requests can be automatically generated. In this
case, they represent instances from the earlier developed model. The input to the PDP is then
both policy and requests generated based on that particular policy. Test case evaluation or
assertion is conducted based on comparing actual input with expected one where the request
or the test case passes if expected and actual outputs are the same. Parser and builder
components are required whenever we want to convert from XAML to an abstract
representation necessary for testing or vice versa. WSO2 and SOAPUI can do most of test
framework tasks. However, they are semi-automated and need user administration in each
step.
The above approach assumes single policy-single request case. However, in many cases
PDP or policy decision may need to combine more than one policy or more than one request
for a particular permit or deny decision. Policies r requests may have contradictory rules and
conflict resolution maybe expected. Verification process can have some other challenges
specially where in some cases; it is difficult to describe expected correct output. In typical
XACML architecture, response is sent as a XACML message with a binary decision of
whether to permit or deny the request.

Figure 5. A XACML Simplified Policy Model [19]
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4. Experiments and Analysis
In order to test the conformance of policies according to standards test cases that represent
instances of policies are created. A policy request represents a test case that we can evaluate a
policy through. Results are then comparison with expected output (aka policy response).
Policy Decision Point (PDP) is tools used to perform test execution and verification. In real
scenarios, PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) sends policy requests to PDP. Along with policy
repository, PDP used incoming request from PEP and relevant policy to generate policy
response and sends it back to PEP to communicate decisions with users or client. Request
includes attributes of: Subject, Action, Resource and Environment while response includes
obligation attributes (e.g., Deny, accept, not applicable, or indeterminate).
In this case study we used WSO2. WSO2 IS XACML implementation is based on
sunxacml. Its administration section, allows users to add or import policies and test them
through policy requests. The actual output from executing policy requests over policy
represents actual policy response that can be compared with expected one in conformance
testing.
In this case study, we selected: Policies, policy requests and responses defined in the
dataset (xacml2.0-ct-v.0.4.zip). Details on this dataset can be found at: https://www.oasisopen.org/committees/document.php?document_id=14846 [20]. Author indicates two versions
of the dataset. XACML 2.0 Conformance Tests V3 published in Sep. 21st 2005 and V4
published in Oct. 10 2005. The contribution here is that author took original conformance
tests published in OASIS for XACML version 1 and evaluates them against XACML version
2. History of dataset versions and details are available in: https://www.oasisopen.org/committees/document.php?-document_id=14846. Policy numbers in the dataset are
labeled according to the sections in the document: II: Mandatory-to-Implement Functionality
Tests, B: Target Matching, C: Function evaluation, D: combining algorithms, E: schema
components, F: XACML 2.0 new features, G: Optional, but Normative Functionality Tests,
GA: DefaultsType, Hierarchical Resources, D: <ResourceContent> Element, E: Multiple
Decisions, F:Attribute Selectors, G: Non-mandatory Functions.
This dataset is used as a baseline to test PEP/PDP implementation engines against
conformance with XACML guidelines and standards. One example of an engine that was
evaluated
against
the
dataset
is
XACMLight
(http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/TECH/OASIS/O110306G.pdf). Figure 6 below shows
summary of XAMLight conformance test.
 The total number of tests was: 333, out of which 328 were successful, 5
were not applicable.
IIA004, IID029.1-2 (not compliant with XSD), IID030.1-2, IIE001, IIE002 are the
policies that produce (not applicable) response.

Figure 6. XACMLight Conformance Test
XACML standards moved from standard 1 to 2 and then to 3. Policies and their related
requests and responses can then be related to one of those three standards. Hence some tests
may fail due to standards inconsistency between what the policy standard is and what the
testing framework is based upon. We used WSO2 framework for testing and evaluation.
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WSO2 framework is currently using XACML 3.0 standard. Figure 7 below summarizes
change history of the current dataset. Numbers like IIC086 represents policy number or name.
IIC086-IIC091: change some attribute types to string.
* IIA004, IIA005 - these files contained intentional syntax errors, which were accidentally
"fixed" when converting to xacml 2.0. Syntax errors are reintroduced.
* IID029, IID030, IIE001, IIE002 - these files were not converted properly to to xacml 2.0:
Condition had FunctionId attribute like in pre xacml 2.0 schemas.

Figure 7. XACML 2 Tests V(4) Change Summary
Comparing Figures 6 and 7, we can see that all policies listed in Figure 8 are shown to
have issues according to initial dataset. Some of those policies include intentional errors such
as: IIA004, IIA005. Others have issues related to conformance with XACML standards.
IIA005 is mentioned to have an intentional error but is now shown in XACMLight
conformance test.
In another example, tester evaluates XACML policies dataset against the tool
(http://xmlsoft.org/xmllint.html) for policies evaluation. However, no elaborate details are
shown
to
indicate
detail
results
of
conformance
testing
results
(http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.comp.java.castor.user/9164). General results showed that
388 policies were tested, II004Policy.xml has a deliberate error, and 387 are valid according
to xmllint. Results were posted in 2010. This means that authors were evaluating against
XACML version 2 standards. 72 policies passed conformance testing. The rest 315 indicates
conformance or validation issues including: Missing abstract element in XML instances.
According to author this was largely since Castor parser deals with “Expression” element as
mandatory while standard does not. The second reported problem is related to miss
conception between policies and policy sets where policy sets are objects to represent
containers. A policy set can have policy sets or policies.
Some of the main features that are shown to be different between XACML V1 and 2
include [20]:
Empty Target element is allowed in XACML 2.0.
“AnySubject” and other Any* elements in the Target are not allowed in XACML 2.0
Environment element is required in Target for Request in XACML 2.0.
“FunctionId” is not allowed in Condition element in XACML 2.0.
“IssueInstant” attribute is not allowed in Attribute in XACML 2.0
We expect to see more issues in our conformance test as WSO2 is evaluating based on
XACML 2 while the dataset is prepared based on version 1 and then version 2 standards.
1. Mandatory-to-Implement Functionality Tests
This section includes 21 policies with their names start with (IIA). This part includes
totally 63 files where each policy file has two files representing request and response. Two
policies (2 and 4) include one extra file called (special). Those special files include extra
instructions to run policies 2 and 4. Originally, there are three possible outputs representing
the status of request evaluation. Those are: Permit, deny or indeterminate. In addition, a
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fourth status: Not applicable can be generated where there is a general mismatch between
policy and request. Table 1 below shows a summary of results.
Table 1. Conformance Testing for Policies of Section A
Response
Policy
IIA001Policy
IIA002Policy
IIA003Policy
IIA004Policy
IIA005Policy
IIA006Policy
IIA007Policy
IIA008Policy
IIA009Policy
IIA0010Policy
IIA0011Policy
IIA0012Policy
IIA0013Policy
IIA0014Policy
IIA0015Policy
IIA0016Policy
IIA0017Policy
IIA0018Policy
IIA0019Policy
IIA0020Policy
IIA0021Policy

Expected
Permit
Permit
NotApplicable
Indeterminate
Permit
Indeterminate
Permit
Indeterminate
Permit
Indeterminate
Permit
Indeterminate
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit

Actual
Indeterminate
NotApplicable
NotApplicable
Invalid schema
Indeterminate
Indeterminate
Indeterminate
Permit
Indeterminate
Permit
Indeterminate
Permit
Indeterminate
Indeterminate
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit

Here are some comments on policies in this section:
 Some policies such as IIA004 were not loaded due to improper schema. The policy has an
intentional error according to its internal documentation (This policy contains
INTENTIONAL syntax error in Subject Attribute Designator, Attribute It attribute is
omitted).
 Many policies have incorrect internal ID (policy ID, rule ID or both) and hence it should
be modified before processing. The main identifier of policies by engines is not their name
but those IDs. Those should be all checked in policies’ dataset.
 Each policy includes two locations to define its ID: Policy ID and Rule ID. Investigations
showed that some conformance error issues are related to inconsistency between those two
IDs that should be the same (Based on tests intentions).
 In summary, all tests’ were according to expectations except for policies one and two.
2. B:Target Matching
“A Target is basically a set of simplified conditions for the Subject, Resource and Action
that must be met for a Policy Set, Policy or Rule to apply to a given request” (OASIS).
Request is then compared with the target section of the policy to make final judgment. For
size limitations, we will show only significant issues in conformance testing in Tables. Table
2 summarizes significant results.

Copyright ⓒ 2014 SERSC
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Table 2. Conformance Testing for Policies of Section B
Total Number of Policies
Total Expected Permit
Total Expected Deny
Total Expected NotApplicable
Total Expected Indeterminate
Total mismatch
Policy
Expected
IIB0016Policy
Permit
IIB0017Policy
NotApplicable
IIB0028Policy
Permit
IIB0029Policy
NotApplicable

53
26
0
27
0
4
Actual
Indeterminate
Indeterminate
Indeterminate
Indeterminate

Policies that show mismatch between actual and expected were: IIB0016, IIB0017 (Subject
with specific KeyInfo value), IIB0028 and IIB0029 (multiple Subjects).
3. C: Function Evaluation
This section includes tests to test mandatory policy functions.
Table 3. Conformance Testing for Policies of Section C
Total Number of Policies
Total Expected Permit
Total Expected Deny
Total Expected Not-Applicable
Total Expected Indeterminate
Total mismatch
Policy
Expected
IIC003Policy
IIC012Policy
IIC014Policy

226
180
0
46
0
0
Actual
Parsing error
Parsing error
Parsing error

With the exception of the three policies that were not parsed correctly (03: Apply with
single-element bag where function expects primitive type, 12: ERROR: Condition Evaluation
- non-boolean data type and 14: ERROR: function: integer-add - non-integer data type) all
other polices passed conformance tests.
4. D: Combining Algorithms
Table 4 shows summary of policy testing for this section.
Table 4. Conformance Testing for Policies of Section D
Total Number of Policies
Total Expected Permit
Total Expected Deny
Total Expected Not-Applicable
Total Expected Indeterminate
Total mismatch
Policy
Expected
IID029-1
NotApplicable
IID030
Deny
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31
8
9
8
6
2
Actual
Permit
Indeterminate
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Two test cases failed. However, special notes are included with policies (29: Permit,
Multiple initial policies, but only one applies and 30: Indeterminate: Multiple initial policies,
more than one applies) where it seems that they are expected to fail.
5. E: Schema Components
As the name implies tests in this section evaluate schema conformance. Table 5 shows
results of this section tests.
Table 5. Conformance Testing for Policies of Section E
Total Number of Policies
Total Expected Permit
Total Expected Deny
Total Expected Not-Applicable
Total Expected Indeterminate
Total mismatch
Policy
Expected
IE001(policy)
NotApplicable
IE001(policy set)
Deny
IE002(policy set)
Deny
IE002(policy)
NotApplicable
IE003(policy set)
Indeterminate

8 (3 basic ones)
3
2
2
1
5
Actual
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit
Permit

Most of tests in this section fail. This is expected since WSO2 tests based on XACML2
while collected dataset was prepared based on XACML2.
6.

F: XACML 2.0 New Features

This set is supposed to test new features in XACML2. No test case was included in this
section. Further, such tests may not be relevant for XACML3 based conformance testing.
7. G: Optional, but Normative Functionality Tests
This section of test cases test optional policy sections.
8. GA: Defaults Type
The first section is related to optional Obligations. This section includes 28 policies. Table
6 includes details of testing section G.A.
Table 6. Conformance Testing for Policies of Section G.A.
Total Number of Policies
Total Expected Permit
Total Expected Deny
Total Expected Not-Applicable
Total Expected Indeterminate
Total mismatch
Policy
Expected
IID029-1
NotApplicable
IID030
Deny
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9. Hierarchical Resources
Table 7 shows results of executing test cases to test this policy section.
Table 7. Conformance Testing for Policies of Section G.A.
Total Number of Policies
Total Expected Permit
Total Expected Deny
Total Expected Not-Applicable
Total Expected Indeterminate
Total mismatch
Policy
Expected
IIIC003
Deny

3
2
1
0
0
1
Actual
Permit

All policies in the left sections: D: <ResourceContent> Element, E: Multiple Decisions, F:
Attribute Selectors and G: Non-mandatory Functions failed to load through WSO2
architecture with parsing problems.

5. Conclusion
Policies should be continuously tested and evaluated as their proper functionalities are very
critical to systems especially in the cloud and web environments. For testing to be effective its
activities should be conducted with little or no human intervention. In addition to typical
testing activities, the testing system should be able to monitor and evaluate changes in
policies and possible system objects that may be affected by such changes.
This paper describes a test automation framework dedicated to test XACML based security
policies. This can be implemented as a standalone testing framework or part of a web,
enterprise, or cloud infrastructure.
Test automation can improve quality without the need for extensive resources. We
proposed a test automation framework to generate, execute and evaluate test cases on
XACML policies.
In the case study section, we evaluated the dataset of test cases available in OASIS website
for testing XACML2. We used WSO2 architecture that contain the framework to export and
test policies. The framework is based on XACML3 standard. We showed test cases that fail
based on either initial specifications or based on conformance issues between XACML 2 and
3 standards.
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